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Abstract. Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are moving from dedi-
cated communications to Ethernet-based interconnected networks, plac-
ing them at risk of cyber attack. ICS networks are typically monitored
by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), however traditional IDSs do
not detect attacks which disrupt the control flow of an ICS. ICSs are
unique in the repetition and restricted number of tasks that are under-
taken. Thus there is the opportunity to use Process Mining, a series of
techniques focused on discovering, monitoring and improving business
processes, to detect ICS control flow anomalies. In this paper we inves-
tigate the suitability of various process mining discovery algorithms for
the task of detecting cyber attacks on ICSs by examining logs from con-
trol devices. Firstly, we identify the requirements of this unique environ-
ment, and then evaluate the appropriateness of several commonly used
process discovery algorithms to satisfy these requirements. Secondly, the
comparison was performed and validated using ICS logs derived from a
case study, containing successful attacks on industrial control systems.
Our research shows that the Inductive Miner process discovery method,
without the use of noise filtering, is the most suitable for discovering a
process model that is effective in detecting cyber-attacks on industrial
control systems, both in processing time and accuracy.
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1 Introduction
There have been several cyber-attacks on ICS devices and infrastructure. One
notable recent example is the December 23, 2015 attack on three Ukrainian
power companies, causing power disruption to 225,000 customers [?]. Such at-
tacks highlight the risk of interconnecting ICS with corporate networks, most
notably in terms of the inadequacy of existing IDSs for control system purposes.
Corporate networks typically use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to monitor
for known cyber-attacks. IDSs come in two types, signature-based IDS (which
compare network traffic to signatures of known cyber-attacks), and statistical
anomaly based IDS, (which examines network traffic over time for unusual be-
haviour). However, these IDSs do not detect attacks which exploit or disrupt the
control flow of an ICS [?], thus, such IDSs may not be sufficient as the goal of
exploiting an ICS network is the disruption of ICS system (which is achievable
through disruption of the control flow of the systems), rather than exfiltration
or infiltration of data as per a typical corporate network attack.
An ICS control flow refers to a process, i.e. a sequence of events, conducted
by an ICS device. These ICS processes are sometimes multiple sequential pro-
cesses operating concurrently. ICS typically executes a series of steps for a given
task, that modify the behaviour of physical devices. Tasks may include creat-
ing various fuels in an oil refinery, manufacturing circuit boards, or large scale
food manufacturing. The order of events in an ICS process is imperative to the
task being conducted, and the deviation from this sequence of events, or control
flow, can disrupt the current industrial process. Using the oil refinery example,
there may be a sequence of events used to burn off excess gases, such as “turn
on flame” → “release gas” → “turn off flame”. Changing the order of events
to “turn on flame” → “turn off flame” → “release gas” could result in the gas
being continually released, potentially damaging equipment. These events may
all be valid ICS events, however when the events are conducted in the incorrect
sequence there is potential to disrupt the industrial process being conducted.
As per the example above, in order to detect anomalies in ICS system, there
is first a need to have knowledge and a model of the expected behaviour of the
ICS process. ICS systems are often modelled using state or control flow diagrams,
where the actual execution semantics of ICS devices are not captured. This is
where techniques from the process mining domain can be of use. Process mining
consists of a series of techniques used to “discover, monitor, and improve real
processes by extracting knowledge from event logs”, and is comprised of process
discovery, conformance checking, and process enhancement techniques [?].
Process discovery is the method of deriving a process model describing the
control flow of a system from an event log. Using this technique there is the
potential to generate process models of an ICS system showing the expected
behaviour, by learning from device logs generated by ICS devices such as PLCs.
Conformance checking is another technique used to compare a process model or
some known business rules to an event log, in order to determine how the events
in the log align with the expected behaviours as captured in a process model. In
the context of ICS security, we can use conformance checking to identify deviant
behaviour that does not match the expected behaviour identified in a generated
process model. Thus, by using process discovery and conformance checking, we
have a set of tools which can be used to identify deviations, or disruptions in an
ICS control flow. In contrast, traditional IDSs which use signatures, or monitor
a network for statistical anomalies, so not focus on the overall control flow of a
process.
There are numerous process discovery algorithms, each of which have advan-
tages and disadvantages. Several studies have been conducted, comparing these
process discovery algorithms [?,?]. However, these comparisons have been con-
ducted in the context of business processes. ICS is a unique environment, and
as such there is a need to have an understanding of which process discovery
algorithm is the most suitable for this environment.
Thus, the contributions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, we identify the
ICS characteristics and ICS modeling requirements. Secondly, we evaluate pro-
cess models generated using several widely used process discovery algorithms,
namely the α-algorithm [?], the Fuzzy Miner [?], the ILP Miner [?], the Flex-
ible Heuristics Miner (FHM) [?], and the Inductive Miner [?] algorithms, on
our ICS process modeling requirements for process discovery. Finally, we vali-
date the evaluation of process models with ICS modeling requirements through
process mining’s conformance checking activity. This conformance checking ac-
tivity was conducted using ICS device logs from industry-standard ICS devices,
four Siemens S7-1200s, which contain cyber-attacks from an 8-hour attacking vs
defending exercise. The process discovery and conformance checking activities
show that process discovery algorithms can be used to generate models, and
detect cyber-attacks, within an ICS control flow.
2 Background
Industrial control systems (ICS), including supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) networks, consist of devices such as programmable logic con-
trollers (PLC) which are controlled by operators through human-machine in-
terfaces (HMI) [?]. These devices are used to control industrial facilities and
critical infrastructure, such as power generation and distribution systems, and
water treatment facilities [?,?].
ICS networks can spread over large geographical regions, and have been tra-
ditionally controlled through point-to-point communications such as serial links.
However, these networks are increasingly migrating from dedicated communica-
tion links to switched and routed corporate networks through specialised gate-
ways, accessed via virtual private networks (VPN) or the Internet. [?,?]. While
exposure to corporate networks and the Internet allows for easier management
of ICS devices over a large geographical distance, it also places these devices at
risk of cyber-attack [?,?].
ICS devices generate device logs, which are typically stored on the PLC, or
in complex ICS networks, these device logs can be aggregated to a Historian, a
device for the storage and archival of device logs. There are several methods ICS
devices use to generate device logs, primarily the “Cyclic” method, which records
all “tags” or memory values on the PLC at some predefined interval of time and
the “On Change” method, which only records values which have changed in
some way. An additional common method of event logging used by ICS devices
is to log an event only when an error occurs. This method of recording events is
not suitable for process mining based analysis, as the error logs do not log the
control flow of the ICS system. From observation of the recorded device logs,
we found the “on change” device logs did not measure each value of all tags
as the value changed, where some tags with high variance (such as measuring
pressure, or water level) were recorded in in 2-3 second intervals. In this regard,
the “Cyclic” method configured with a 1 second polling interval provides more
complete and accurate device logs than the “on change” method. As such, in
this paper, we use the Cyclic type of device log as the starting point for process
mining based analysis.
Process models, generated by process discovery algorithms, capture the nor-
mative behaviour of the system being modeled. As an example of a process
model, we have a sequence of events, (A,B,D). In the second iteration of the
process, the sequence of events is (A,C,D). This can be represented in a process
model using a Petri-net, describing the control flow of the process, as shown in
Figure ??. This method of discovering and modeling the sequence of events can
be applied to ICS systems, with the potential to be used to discover a process
model, and attacks on the control flow of an ICS process.
Fig. 1: Example of a process model capturing both sequential and concurrent events.
There are a wide range of process discovery algorithms, which can be iden-
tified in several types; such as abstraction-based, heuristic-based, search-based
and region-based algorithms [?]. The issue of determining the “best” process
mining discovery algorithm for a process discovery activity is a known issue in
the process mining domain [?], and several comparisons of algorithms have pre-
viously been conducted [?,?]. While process discovery and conformance checking
have previously been used in the area of security auditing of business processes
to detect anomalous behaviour in various contexts [?,?,?] they are insufficient
in the ICS context. This is because there are a number of differences between
business processes, the traditional focus of process mining, and ICS processes.
Business processes typically contain events which are executed by humans and
recorded by an information system, such as a Workflow Management System [?].
Compared to ICS processes, these business processes are far more flexible and
varied than an ICS process, which is a structured and rigid sequence of events
executed by a ICS device. In addition to this difference, event logs generated
from business processes are typically far more verbose when compared to de-
vice logs from ICS devices, such as PLCs. Therefore, there is a need to identify
which process mining algorithm(s) are best for discovering and modeling an ICS
process.
To determine which process discovery algorithms are most suitable to gen-
erate process models from ICS device logs, that can also be used as an input
to a conformance checking activity, we have identified several process discov-
ery algorithms for comparison. These discovery algorithms, namely, are the α-
algorithm [?], the Integer Linear Programming (ILP) Miner [?], the Flexible
Heuristics Miner (FHM) [?], and the Inductive Miner (IM) [?] algorithms. These
algorithms were selected as they appear promising for use in conformance check-
ing to detect cyber-attacks on ICS devices. Before we can assess the algorithms,
we need to identify requirements needed to create a suitable model of ICS pro-
cesses.
3 ICS Modeling Requirements
In the context of ICS networks, there are two main goals for the discovery of
an ICS process model. Firstly, to use as an input for a conformance checking
activity for the goal of detecting cyber-attacks in an ICS event log, and secondly,
to create a process model of an ICS process which is clear and understandable
for human interpretation. To generate a process model to suit both of these
goals, a process discovery algorithm is used. Process discovery algorithms all
have several common features, including the ability to model both sequential
and concurrent events, and in addition model repeating event sequences. We
have identified several further characteristics for consideration when identifying
the most suitable algorithm for ICS process discovery.
Usable Model Representation. For our analysis, we require a usable pro-
cess model, which contains clear execution semantics, for use in the conformance
checking activity. The current state-of-the-art conformance checking activities
require the use of Petri-net models. As such, throughout our experiments we use
Petri-net models to represent our ICS process and conduct conformance checking
activities.
Accuracy. Rozinat, et. al. [?] outline two evaluation dimensions which can
be applied to determine the accuracy of a model, “Fitness”, and “Precision”.
The first dimension, fitness, describes how well the event log matches the pro-
cess model. Fitness is measured numerically, between 0 and 1, where 1 represents
a perfect fit. Some process discovery techniques remove “noise” a process model,
commonly to simplicity of the model. Examples of this are the Fuzzy Miner,
and the Inductive Miner. However, this will lower the fitness of the model. For
conformance checking purposes, especially for identifying anomalous events, the
fitness of the generated process model is imperative. The Precision evaluation di-
mensions prevents over general models, where the generated models are accurate
to the process being modelled.
Simplicty. This requirement reflects the goal of creating a process model
of an ICS process which is clear and understandable for human interpretation.
In most ICS networks, there does not exist a process model of either individual
process, or an overall model. The generated process model must be represented
in a way which is understandable, avoiding overcomplicated “spaghetti” models.
In the case of anomaly detection, when a process model is visually complex,
it becomes difficult for a human to quickly visually validate the anomaly. Roz-
inat, et. al. [?], describe two evaluation dimensions which can apply to this
simplicity requirement, “Generalisation” and “Structure”. The Generalisation
evaluation dimension, conversely to “Precision”, prevents over precise models,
where over precise models may show each path in the process and may contain
duplicate events, which may be easier to understand but less fitting. The Struc-
ture dimension refers to the visual structure of the process model. highly fitting
process models may be visually complicated, and hard to read and interpret.
Modeling repeating event sequences is a common feature of all process discov-
ery algorithms, and can be modeled either directly in the model, or expressed
through the use of silent (τ)-transitions (suitable when there is a choice in the
model). Silent transitions are not necessary to model repeating event sequences
in a process model, however make the model less complicated.These evaluation
dimensions can have an effect on the accuracy of the process model, where more
generalisation can reduce the overall fitness of the model.
4 Experiment
In this section, we outline our experimental methodology to evaluate process
models generated by discovery algorithms, and compare to our identified ICS
Characteristics and ICS Modelling requirements. Firstly, we outline the exper-
imental setup, describing the ICS devices, logging method, and dataset used
throughout our experiment. Secondly, we describe our process discovery, and
validation using conformance checking activities.
4.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup consists of four distinct scale industrial control systems,
each of these controlled by industry-standard PLCs, Siemens S7-1200’s. These
four scale systems include; a bi-directional conveyor belt system, a water pump
system, and a “reactor” system, all connected to a master power meter. These
systems are controlled through the use of a HMI, which acts as a historian,
collecting device logs from each of the PLCs. These devices together with the
HMI made a “Process Control Network”, connecting to a multi-level corporate
network through a gateway, representing a typical ICS network. The device
logs recorded throughout our experiment are “Cyclic” device logs, which were
configured to record with a 1 second interval, and stored in comma-separated
values (CSV) format. This “Cyclic” device log method is where the value of all
“tags”, or addresses in a PLCs memory, are recorded every specified interval,
in our configuration, every 1 second. An example of a typical, unprocessed ICS
device log is shown below, in Table ??.
The scale industrial systems form one complete industrial process. This indus-
trial process starts with the bi-directional conveyor belt system, which consists
of two loops. Two sensors; one which detects the presence of a round disk called
a “puck”, and one which detects the colour of a puck, control the direction of a
“paddle”. As an example of the “Cyclic” device logging method, a snippet of the
device log from the conveyor belt is shown in Table ??. Once every second all
“tags”, or memory addresses on the PLC are logged. When a puck is detected,
the “VarValue” of the tag ”Conv Read Conv Color PE”, shown in Table ??, will
change from 0 to 1 or −1 depending on the colour of the puck. Once a puck is
detected and the colour is determined, the paddle will direct the puck onto one
of the two conveyor belt loops depending on the colour.
VarName TimeString VarValue Validity Time ms
Conv Read Conv Color PE 16/07/2015 9:31 0 1 42201396613
Conv Read Conv HMI Direction 16/07/2015 9:31 0 1 42201396613
Conv Read Conv Present PE 16/07/2015 9:31 0 1 42201396613
Conv Read Solenoid Left Direction 16/07/2015 9:31 0 1 42201396613
Conv Read Solenoid Right Direction 16/07/2015 9:31 0 1 42201396613
Table 1: Example snippet of a typical ICS device log, obtained from the conveyor belt
system.
Once the conveyor belt system has completed, the water tank system begins
to operate. The water tank system consists of an upper reservoir and a lower
reservoir full of water. The lower reservoir is connected to a water pump, which
transfers water to the upper reservoir, which uses gravity to feed water back to
the lower reservoir. The upper water reservoir contains a water sensor, which
turns off the pump when the specified water level is met. This process repeats
until a specified time length has elapsed.
The final stage of the industrial process is the “reactor”, a pressure vessel
system. The reactor is a pipe system, which is connected to an air compressor,
and a solenoid with pressure sensors measures the pressure level in pounds per
square inch (PSI). once a specified pressure level has been reaches, the solenoid
activates and opens its valve, releasing air and lowering the pressure to a lower
level. Once the lower level has been reached, the solenoid closes and the “reactor”
begins to build pressure once again. This process repeats for a designated period
of time, at which the remaining pressure is released and the air compressor
switches off.
The device logs were generated by the PLCs throughout the operation of an 8
hour exercise, in which two teams: a defending team of four people protecting the
process control and corporate networks from an attacking team of six attackers,
sourced from industry, with industrial experience. The attackers were tasked
with disrupting the process, through exploiting the “Process Control Network”,
and cause the ICS devices to deviate from the programmed, expected behaviour
of that device.
One example of the attacking team successfully disrupting the industrial
process is the changing of the direction of the bi-directional conveyor belt. The
conveyor belt sorts coloured “pucks” placed on the belt, sending each colour
around a different loop on the conveyor. The attacking team successfully com-
promised the HMI, and changed the sorting direction of these coloured pucks.
This results in the pucks being directed around the wrong direction, disrupting
the expected industrial process. Throughout this exercise the attacking team
were successfully able to disrupt the industrial process running on all three
systems, the conveyor belt system, the water tank system, and the “reactor”
system. The device logs from each ICS system were collected by the HMI on
the “Process Control Network”, which acted as the Historian. These collected
devices logs contained the cyber-attacks that were conducted by the attacking
team throughout the duration of the 8 hour exercise. These device logs were then
aggregated and pre-processed, creating our dataset of event logs, and preparing
them for process mining activities.
The dataset consisted 25 cases, with 71 event classes and a total of 1855
events. One “case” represents a complete execution of the ICS process. The
PLCs, HMI, and device logging methods were programmed and configured through
the use of WinCC and STEP 7, as part of the Siemens TIA Portal V11 SP2.
The experiments were not conducted on production ICS networks, as attacks
conducted upon these scale systems interrupt the control flow of the ICS pro-
cess. These scale systems and industrial process used throughout or experiments,
while not production systems, use industry-standard ICS devices, four Siemens
S7-1200 PLCs.
4.2 Experimental Methodology
Using our dataset of pre-processed event logs, generated from device logs aggre-
gated throughout the 8 hour exercise, we discover 5 process models using the
widely used algorithms outlined in Section ??. These include the α-algorithm,
ILP Miner, Flexible Heuristics Miner, Inductive Miner configured with default
fitness, and Inductive Miner configured with perfect fitness. The default and
perfect fitness for the Inductive Miner are configuration parameters when gen-
erating a process model. The use of both Inductive Miner with default fitness
and the Inductive Miner with perfect fitness to generate a process model, is to
compare the results of removing noise and low-varying events from a process
model and the impact this has upon conformance checking for anomaly detec-
tion. In addition to the models generated by process discovery algorithms, we
use a manually-created Petri-net model of the ICS process. While the manual
creation of a process model can capture an accurate picture of an ICS process,
this requires specialist knowledge of the ICS systems, and process, being mod-
eled. Using process discovery algorithms, a process model of a complicated ICS
system can be created without this in-depth knowledge requirement.
To discover a process model using the outlined algorithms from our dataset,
we extracted the first 10 cases, or first 10 complete process executions of the ICS
process; a representative sample of the complete ICS process where the cases were
known to contain no cyber-attacks. Using the Disco1 tool, we converted the pre-
processed event log from CSV format to XES format, for use with the Process
Mining Toolkit (ProM)2 version 6.5.1. Using the Petri-net models generated
1 http://fluxicon.com/disco/
2 http://www.promtools.org/doku.php
using the ProM tool, and our manually created Petri-net model, we conducted a
total of 6 conformance checks, using ProM with the “Replay a Log on Petri Net
for Conformance Analysis” plug-in, comparing each discovered process model
against our full dataset. Both the process discovery and conformance checking
activities were conducted on a Dell Optiplex 9020 desktop computer, with an
i7-4770 CPU, 16GB RAM and 256GB SSD.
5 Results and Analysis
We have laid out in Section ?? the requirements for generating process models,
firstly for use in a conformance checking activity with the goal of identifying
anomalies, such as cyber attacks, in an ICS event log, and secondly for human
interpretation. The process ,models generated by the selected process mining
algorithms, outlined in Section ?? are evaluated by these requirements, and
the results of this evaluation are described under each requirement below, and
summarised in Table ??.
Algorithm Model Accuracy Simplicity
α-algorithm [?] 3 3 7
ILP Miner [?] 3 3 7
FHM [?] 3/7 7 3
IM (Default) [?] 3 7 3
IM (Perfect) [?] 3 3 3
Table 2: Comparison of models generated by selected process discovery algorithms with
identified requirements of ICS process discovery.
All models were either generated in or can be converted to Petri-net form,
making all models usable in a conformance checking activity. To test the “Fit-
ness” of the generated process models, we conduct a conformance check on the
representative sample used to generate each model. The process models gener-
ated by the ILP Miner, α-algorithm, and Inductive Miner with perfect fitness,
all fit the representative example of the ICS process event log which was taken to
generate the process models, and are precise. Both models generated by the Flex-
ible Heuristics Miner with a move-log fitness of 0.27, and the Inductive Miner,
configured with default fitness, with a move-log fitness of 0.95, do not fit this
sample. This is due to both algorithms filtering infrequent events. The process
model generated for use in conformance checking for anomaly detection must be
as close to, or perfectly fitting, to the ICS process as possible. Any non fitting
events during a later conformance check for anomaly detection are treated as
“anomalous”, resulting in “false positives” as the model is inaccurate. This can
be observed in Table ??. From this “fitness” metric, we can determine that the
process models generated by the Flexible Heuristics Miner and Inductive Miner
Fig. 2: Process model Generated using Inductive Miner (perfect fitness).
with default fitness are not suitable for use in a conformance checking activity
to detect anomalous events, such as cyber attacks.
We have identified two evaluation dimensions for the Simplicity requirement,
described in Section ?? “Generalisation” and “Structure”. Both the generalisa-
tion and structure dimensions can be evaluated through observation of each of
the generated process models. The process models generated by the Heuristics
Miner, and Inductive Miner are both structured and are at a suitable level of
generalisation, showing the control flow of the ICS process without impacting
on the fitness of the process model. However, the models generated by the α-
algorithm and ILP Miner, although fitting, have significantly more arcs within
the model, with 47 places connected by 122 arcs, and 26 places connected by
179 arcs respectively. This significant difference in arcs is shown in Figure ??.
This is compared to Inductive Miner with 30 places connected by 88 Arcs for
default fitness, and 34 places connected by 110 arcs for perfect fitness, resulting
in the ILP and α-algorithm models being less structured and visually harder
to interpret. The process models generated by the Flexible Heuristic Miner and
Inductive Miner with both default fitness and perfect fitness settings model re-
peating event sequences through the use of silent transitions. These models with
silent transitions simplify the model, resulting in the models being easier to
interpret.
Fig. 3: Process model Generated with ILP Miner for illustrative purposes, showing less
genearlisation and structure, with significantly more arcs in model.
Using the process models shown in Figure 3, generated from several widely
used discovery algorithms, we conduct several conformance checking activities
on our pre-processed ICS event log. Our dataset contained 25 cases, five of these
cases contained cyber-attacks which were conducted on the experimental setup
throughout the duration of the 8-hour exercise, outlined in section 4.1. The
results of these conformance checking activities are shown below, in Table 4,
including number detected anomalous cases, Trace and Move-Log Fitness, and
calculation time in milliseconds. The “Trace Fitness” value represents how well
the event log fits the Petri-net models generated by the discovery algorithms.
The conformance checking activities were successfully able to identify the 5
anomalous cases on models generated by the α-algorithm, ILP Miner, Inductive
Miner with perfect fitness, and our existing, manually-created model, as shown
in Table ??. These anomalous cases contain the cyber-attacks conducted by
the attacking team throughout the 8 hour exercise, showing where the event
log deviates from the expected behaviour of the ICS, outlined in the generated
process models. An example of this deviation can be shown with the water tank
system. During one attack case, the attackers exploited the HMI and changed
the operation of the water tank from “automatic” to “manual”. This allows an
attacker to manually control the level at which the water level sensor activates,
potentially allowing the attackers to overflow one of the water reservoirs. When
this event is recorded in the device log, and “replayed” over the process models
during the conformance checking activity, it appears as a deviation where the
event did not “fit” the process model representing the control flow of the ICS
process.
Algorithm Anomalous Cases Trace Fitness Time(ms)
α-algorithm [?] 5 0.93 25.60
ILP Miner [?] 5 0.93 2.08
FHM [?] 25 0.31 54.24
IM [?] (Perfect) 5 0.93 1.88
IM [?] (Default) 24 0.89 1.48
Manual Model 5 0.93 28.68
Table 3: Results of conformance checking activity on discovered process models.
Both models created by the Flexible Heuristics Miner and Inductive Miner
with default fitness settings failed to accurately model the ICS process, resulting
in the conformance check returning both 25 and 24 anomalous cases, respectively.
This was caused by both Flexible Heuristics Miner and Inductive Miner reducing
“noise”.
The Flexible Heuristics Miner, and Inductive Miner with default fitness, both
employ methods of filtering noise and low-frequency events. While the removal
of noise is a common and useful practice in process mining activities, it is not
recommended in anomaly detection for identifying cyber-attacks, as the models
must accurately represent the behaviour of the ICS. Removing low-frequency
events or “noise” from the model can result in false positives, as shown with
Flexible Heuristics Miner and Inductive Miner (with default fitness). These re-
sults suggest that the Inductive Miner algorithm, configured with perfect fitness,
is the most suitable process discovery algorithm for both the creation of a process
model of an ICS process for human interpretation, and for use in a conformance
checking activity with the goal of identifying anomalies, such as cyber attacks,
in a ICS event log. One limitation to current process discovery algorithms is
the concept of a “case” in process mining. Most ICS device logs do not have an
indication of “case”, and require a pre-processing stage to prepare the logs for
process mining activities.
In addition to detected cases, we found considerable differences in the time
required for conducing the conformance checks. The ProM tool reported the
calculation time in milliseconds(ms) taken for each full conformance check. The
conformance check on the model generated by the Flexible Heuristics Miner was
conducted in the largest amount of time, a total of 54.24ms. This was followed
by the existing, manually-created model in 28.68ms, and the α-algorithm in
25.60ms. The conformance checks using the models generated by the Inductive
Miner (with perfect fitness), the Inductive Miner (with default fitness), and
ILP Miner, were significantly faster. The Inductive Miner with perfect fitness
completing in 1.88(ms), with default fitness in 1.48ms, and the ILP miner in
2.08 ms. The conformance check upon the manually-created model the returned
same anomalous cases as process models generated by the α-algorithm, ILP
Miner, and Inductive Miner configured with perfect fitness, however took more
time to complete, in 28.68ms. This indicates the process models generated by
process discovery algorithms, which do not filter “noise” or low-frequency events,
can accurately capture an ICS process.
Existing IDS used on ICS networks rely on signatures of known attacks
in signature-based IDS, or long-term analysis of network traffic in statistical
anomaly based IDS. For a signature of an cyber-attack to exist, there must
be prior knowledge of the cyber-attack. Our process mining based process dis-
covery and conformance checking methods used in this paper have successfully
detected cyber-attacks conducted on industry standard ICS devices, the Siemens
S7-1200, using process models generated by widely-used process discovery algo-
rithms. This shows process mining can be used in supplement to traditional IDS
devices to detect previously-unknown cyber-attacks.
6 Conclusion
The conformance checking activity with the α-algorithm, ILP Miner, Inductive
Miner with perfect fitness all successfully identifying the five anomalous cases
containing cyber attacks in the ICS event log. Although the ILP miner and α-
algorithm identified all attacks, the conformance check on the model generated
by the Inductive Miner was conducted significantly faster, in a reported 1.88ms
compared to 2.09ms by the ILP Miner, or the α-algorithm at 25.60ms. In addition
to speed, both the ILP Miner and α-algorithms, although fitting, are visually
more complex compared to models generated by the other algorithms.
We have identified areas of future work. The process mining based methods
presented in this paper, unlike IDS systems, are a form of oﬄine analysis, which
takes place on device logs after a process has been completed. An area of future
work is to modify this method to operate in real or near-real time to improve the
detection speed of ICS anomalies. In addition, an assessment of the scalability
of this method is required.
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